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The Right to Remain Silent in Light of the
War on Terror
Ronald J. Rychlak*
“The law will not suffer a prisoner to be made the deluded instrument
of his own conviction.”
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (quoting 2 William
Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown ch. 46 § 34 (8th ed.
1824)).
“[T]he ready ability to obtain uncoerced confessions is not an evil but
an unmitigated good . . . . Admissions of guilt resulting from valid
Miranda waivers ‘are more than merely “desirable”; they are essential
to society’s compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing
those who violate the law.’”
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991) (quoting Moran v.
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986)).

INTRODUCTION
The familiar words of the Miranda warning are known by
almost all Americans who have watched television at any time
since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona.1 The precise rules have evolved over the years, but most
people know that they have the right to remain silent and the
right to have an attorney appointed if they cannot afford one.
There can be difficult issues of proof in court, but litigants, attorneys, and judges fundamentally know how Miranda works.2
That is not to say, however, that Miranda is uncontroversial.
Few areas of law provoke more consistent debate than interrogation and confessions,3 and Miranda’s exclusion of incriminating
* MDLA Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of
Mississippi School of Law. The author would like to thank the Chapman Law Review,
Chapman University, and the National Center for Justice and the Rule of Law at the
University of Mississippi School of Law for support in researching this topic.
1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 If a suspect is interrogated while in custody, the officer has to inform the suspect
of his or her rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present for questioning, and
the suspect must waive those rights or statements made by the suspect will be inadmissible at trial. Id. at 444–45.
3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 291 (2d ed. Hornbook Series 1992).
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statements in some criminal cases has only added to the controversy. Moreover, the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent War on Terror have renewed interest in the issue of interrogation and confessions. The stakes have gotten higher.4
The dilemma most often presented is the “ticking bomb” scenario. This is the situation in which the authorities want to interrogate a suspect who is in custody regarding his knowledge
about a ticking bomb or a planned terrorist attack.5 Is this suspect entitled not to incriminate himself? What about the right to
have an attorney present, or the right to remain silent? The responses to these questions might seem obvious to many people:
an emphatic “no and no.”6 In reality, of course, the more likely
scenario is one in which several suspects are in custody, and one
or more of them may have knowledge relevant to a planned terrorist attack but many others will have no such knowledge.
What rights are to be accorded the suspects in that situation?
To properly address this issue, one must resolve several preliminary questions, including: Do standard criminal procedure
laws apply? Where are the suspects being held (inside or outside
of the United States)? What is their citizenship status? How urgent is the supposed threat? How reliable is the information
known by the authorities? Can torture ever be justified, and how
is it defined? What about psychological pressure? What is the
consequence of violating the rights of the detainee/prisoner?
What international obligations apply?7 Many of these questions
4 “[C]laims of violations of human-rights law or the Constitution must be evaluated
in the context of the realities created by Sept. 11.” John C. Yoo, Perspectives on the Rules
of War: Sept. 11 Has Changed the Rules, S.F. CHRON., June 15, 2004, at B9. See also
M.K.B. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh: Confessions Law in an Age of Terrorism,
12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 319 (2003) (proposing a “foreign interrogation” exception to
Miranda).
5 See George J. Terwillinger III, “Domestic Unlawful Combatants”: A Proposal to
Adjudicate Constitutional Detentions, ENGAGE, Oct. 2006, at 55, 55 (setting forth a similar
scenario).
6 JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR
152 (2006) (“The Fifth Amendment’s right to remain silent . . . applies only in the criminal
justice system.”). Yoo details the problems of providing similar rights to terrorist suspects. Id. at 152–53. But see United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (holding that FBI agents sent to Afghanistan to interrogate captured members of
the al Qaeda network had to abide by constitutional limitations). The Court stated, “The
Supreme Court cases on point suggest that the Fourth Amendment applies to United
States citizens abroad. . . . Thus, this Court finds that even though the searches at issue
in this case occurred in Kenya, El-Hage can bring a Fourth Amendment challenge.” Id. at
270–71.
7 See James A. Deeken, Note, A New Miranda for Foreign Nationals? The Impact of
Federalism on International Treaties that Place Affirmative Obligations on State Governments in the Wake of Printz v. United States, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 997 (1998). In
early 2007, German prosecutors indicted several CIA agents for allegedly capturing a
German citizen, taking him to a third country, and subjecting him to harsh interrogation.
Mark Landler, German Court Challenges C.I.A. over Abduction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2007,
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go beyond the scope of this article, but as this Symposium reveals, the rights of terrorist suspects and the potential applicability of Miranda are much more than hypothetical questions. Governmental sources, academic commentators, and the media have
all recently devoted a great deal of attention to these subjects.8
As the United States continues to fight the War on Terror and
seek out terrorist activity located outside of this nation, interrogations of non-American citizens by American officials will undoubtedly increase both in number and importance.
Certainly an American citizen arrested within the United
States would have the right not to incriminate himself. Presumably a foreign national arrested outside of the United States
would not be fully protected.9 Other scenarios present more difficult issues.10 American courts, therefore, have to determine
whether the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against selfincrimination applies to non-American citizens, and whether an
American police or military agent conducting an investigation
abroad must provide some type of warnings before conducting an
interrogation.11 The initial question would seem to be whether
terrorist suspects are even entitled to the right protected by
Miranda—the right not to incriminate themselves.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF SELF-INCRIMINATION
The problems with permitting suspects to testify against
at A1.

8 See Mark A. Godsey, Miranda’s Final Frontier—The International Arena: A Critical Analysis of United States v. Bin Laden, and a Proposal For a New Miranda Exception
Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703 (2002); Robert L. Bartley, A ‘Miranda’ Warning for Saddam?
Democrats Try to Discredit America’s Victory, OPINIONJOURNAL.COM, July 14, 2003,
http://www.opinionjournal.com/forms/printThis.html?id=110003743;
Andrew
C.
McCarthy, McCain & Miranda: “Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading” May Prove More Dangerous
than
Meets
the
Eye,
NAT’L
REV.
ONLINE,
Dec.
15,
2005,
http://www.nationalreview.com (follow “Search” hyperlink; then follow “National Review
Online” hyperlink; then search “more dangerous than meets the eye”).
9 See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922) (“[T]he same rule of interpretation should not be applied to criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the Government’s jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the
right of the Government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own citizens, officers or agents.”). But see Bin
Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 270 (“The Government seems to concede the general applicability of the Fourth Amendment to American citizens abroad . . . .”).
10 When Congress focuses a statute on extraterritorial conduct or provides an explicit extraterritorial provision in the statute, it is clear that there is a basis for prosecuting extraterritorial activities. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, “Defensive Territoriality”: A
New Paradigm for the Prosecution of Extraterritorial Business Crimes, 31 GA. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 1 (2002).
11 Complicating these questions is the fact that the laws of many foreign nations do
not provide suspects with the full range of rights embodied in Miranda, such as the right
to remain silent or the right to speak to an attorney. Thus, informing a foreign national
of these rights might actually mislead the suspect, at least as to any prosecution that
might take place in that nation. Godsey, supra note 8, at 1708.
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themselves (which often leads to suspects being forced to testify
against themselves) have long been recognized. As early as 866,
Pope St. Nicholas I wrote:
If a [putative] thief or bandit is apprehended and denies the
charges against him, you tell me your custom is for a judge to beat
him with blows to the head and tear the sides of his body with other
sharp iron goads until he confesses the truth. Such a procedure is totally unacceptable under both divine and human law . . . , since a confession should be spontaneous, not forced. It should be proffered voluntarily, not violently extorted. After all, if it should happen that
even after inflicting all these torments, you still fail to wrest from the
sufferer any self-incrimination regarding the crime of which he is accused, will you not then at least blush for shame and acknowledge
how impious is your judicial procedure? Likewise, suppose an accused
man is unable to endure such torments and so confesses to a crime he
never committed. Upon whom, pray tell, will now devolve the full
brunt of responsibility for such an enormity, if not upon him who coerced the accused into confessing such lies about himself?12

One way to avoid these problems is to provide suspects with
the right to remain silent. For at least 400 years, Great Britain
has extended the privilege against self-incrimination to criminal
suspects,13 and scholars have been debating the merits of that
privilege all along.14
Police and prosecuting authorities consider confessions to be
not only persuasive (and in some cases conclusive) of guilt, but
also absolutely necessary for the smooth functioning of the criminal legal system. Suspects, however, do not typically confess to
civil authorities to cleanse their souls. As one author put it, “by
any standards of human discourse, a criminal confession can
never truly be called voluntary. With rare exception, a confession is compelled, provoked and manipulated from a suspect by a
12 Brian W. Harrison, The Church and Torture, THIS ROCK, Dec. 2006, at 23, 25
(quoting Pope Nicholas I, Ad Consulta Vestra ch. 86 (Nov. 13, 866)) (first alteration in
original). Nicholas went on to suggest a different approach based on scripture (Hebrews
6:16), which involved making the person swear innocence on the Holy Gospel and accepting his word at that point. Pope Nicholas I, Ad Consulta Vestra ch. 86 (Nov. 13, 866),
available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/866nicholas-bulgar.html.
13 See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT: A STUDY OF THE ENGLISH
CRIMINAL TRIAL 42–43 (2d ed. 1958) (describing the 1568 Court of Common Pleas’ release
of a defendant imprisoned for not answering the judge’s questions).
14 See, e.g., id. at 48–58 (summarizing criticism of the privilege by Jeremy Bentham,
among others); 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, SPECIALLY
APPLIED TO ENGLISH PRACTICE 229–41 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1995) (1827) (criticizing
the exclusion of self-incriminating evidence because the innocent would want to speak,
and therefore the privilege would only protect the guilty); Ian Dennis, Instrumental Protection, Human Right or Functional Necessity? Reassessing the Privilege against SelfIncrimination, 54 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 342, 342–53 (1995) (concluding that the system should
apply the privilege in limited contexts and not view it as a human right); David Dolinko,
Is There a Rationale for the Privilege against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063,
1064 (1986) (describing the privilege as a historical relic).
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detective who has been trained in a genuinely deceitful art.”15
Investigators throughout history have resorted to tactics, some of
them unsavory, to encourage statements from suspects.16 The
Miranda rules are designed to regulate police interrogations by
requiring them to inform suspects of their legal rights and by
suppressing statements that are taken in violation of those
rights.
In the days of the Star Chamber, procedures such as the rack
and other instruments of torture were used to obtain confessions.
Concern over the harsh tactics to compel statements from prisoners gradually resulted in the development of the right to remain
silent.17 In fact, because of the force that was being used to compel confessions, Great Britain eventually prohibited all parties,
including criminal defendants, from testifying as witnesses at
their trials.18
A complete ban on all testimony from parties was eventually
recognized as an obstacle in the pursuit of truth, and the prohibition was lifted.19 Criminal defendants were permitted to testify,
but they also had the right not to testify.20 Judges, however,
could comment on a defendant’s failure to testify.21
Following English common law, early American courts permitted the introduction of confessions without restriction, even if
law enforcement officials abridged the rights of those being interDAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 199 (1991).
In The Proof of Guilt, Glanville Williams describes procedures such as the rack
and other instruments of torture used to obtain confessions “in the bad old days” of the
Star Chamber. WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 38–41.
17 See WILLIAMS, supra note 13 (describing the development of the privilege over
hundreds of years). Some historians date the beginning of the concept of a privilege to
1637, with John Lilburn, a Star Chamber case. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
459 (1966) (identifying Lilburn as a critical historical event in the development of the
privilege). Parliament abolished the Star Chamber after this trial. See id. (noting the
Star Chamber’s fall following the Lilburn trial). Other scholars trace the privilege even
further back in time. See MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 244 n.2
(Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972) (noting the view that the privilege dates back to
canon law); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458–59 n.27 (noting that some commentators find
analogous principles in the Bible).
18 Scott Rowley, The Competency of Witnesses, 24 IOWA L. REV. 482, 485–90 (1939).
See also WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 43 (describing procedures regarding the defendant
as a witness in the 1700s).
19 The House of Commons passed the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898. See WILLIAMS,
supra note 13, at 45–48 (noting that the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898 was developed to
counteract unmerited acquittals resulting from defendants not testifying); see also Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36 (Eng.) (changing rules regarding the competency of witnesses).
20 See Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36, § 1(a) (Eng.) (stating that a
charged person “shall be a competent witness,” but “shall [only] be called . . . upon his own
application”).
21 See WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 59–61. In addition, once a defendant elected to
testify, the Act compelled him to answer incriminating questions. Id.
15
16
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rogated.22 The key issue was whether the confession was reliable.23 Too often, forcibly extracted confessions were given by the
suspects solely to stop the interrogation.24 This focus on reliability dominated American confession law well into the twentieth
century.25
In the 1944 case Ashcraft v. Tennessee, the Supreme Court
discussed aggressive interrogation methods known as the “third
degree.”26 These techniques were designed to force confessions
without brutal force, but with tactics such as powerful lights,
persistent questioning over numerous hours, and deprivation of
sleep.27 The Court held that where the manner of interrogation
was “inherently coercive,” the confession would be inadmissible
regardless of reliability.28 Importantly, if impermissible methods
were used, a confession would be inadmissible regardless of the
impact that the methods had on that particular defendant.29
The problem with the “voluntariness test” was that virtually
all confessions are “involuntary” to some extent. As one author
put it, “[B]y any standards of human discourse, a criminal confession can never truly be called voluntary. With rare exception,
a confession is compelled, provoked and manipulated from a suspect by a detective who has been trained in a genuinely deceitful
LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 3, at 294.
See id. (“[T]he question was put in terms of whether the defendant’s confession
had been induced by a promise of benefit or threat of harm, while on other occasions the
inquiry was more directly put in terms of whether the circumstances under which the defendant had spoken impaired the reliability of the confession.”).
24 The actual number of false confessions is unknown and probably unknowable. It
is certainly subject to debate. Compare Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An
Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 523, 529 (1999) (stating that “false confessions occur quite infrequently”),
with Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 430 (1998) (arguing that false confessions are much more
common).
25 Richard A. Leo et al., Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal
Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479, 494; see also Joseph D.
Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859, 863
(1979). Military commissions still look to see whether information is relevant and reliable
in order to decide issues of admissibility. YOO, supra note 6, at 218–19.
26 322 U.S. 143, 150–52 (1944).
27 Id. at 150 & n.6. The Court found Ashcraft’s confession involuntary, compelled,
and thus inadmissible. Id. at 153. This conclusion was based on the officers’ continual
relay-style interrogation over a period of thirty-six hours without rest. Id.
28 Id. at 154. See also Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50 n.2 (1949) (citing Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219, 236–37 (1941)) (noting that if circumstances indicate that the
confession was not given by the free will of the defendant, it will not be deemed voluntary
and therefore will be inadmissible, even though the statements may be reliable).
29 Ashcraft, 332 U.S. at 160. The Court has noted, however, that the characteristics
of a particular defendant might subject him or her to particular peril. See Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986) (“[M]ental condition is surely relevant to an individual’s susceptibility to police coercion.”).
22
23
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art.”30 Critics also argued that the voluntariness test permitted
too much pressure to be applied on suspects, as it only prohibited
prosecutors from using evidence obtained by “interrogation
methods that would exert so much pressure that the suspect
would admit to facts regardless of whether she believed in the
truth of the facts admitted.”31 Nevertheless, the voluntariness
rule survives even today,32 though it is often overshadowed by
Miranda.
In the late 1950s, the Supreme Court put in place the socalled McNabb-Mallory rule.33 Based on a federal statute34 and
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,35 this rule held that a
criminal defendant had to be arraigned “without unnecessary delay” and that any confession obtained during such a delay could
be excluded from evidence in any subsequent prosecution.36 This
rule was never constitutionally required, and it was eventually
supplanted by Miranda.37
In the 1960s, the Warren Court dramatically reshaped the
way society dealt with criminals and criminal suspects. Prior to
that time, protections afforded defendants in state criminal proceedings (where most criminal cases are tried) were often quite
limited. The Bill of Rights applied only to the federal govern30 SIMON, supra note 15, at 199. On the other hand, recent studies suggest that
about 20% of the confessions obtained by the police would have been made even if there
had been no interrogation. Eugene R. Milhizer, Rethinking Police Interrogation: Encouraging Reliable Confessions while Respecting Suspects’ Dignity, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 56
(2006).
31 Welsh S. White, What is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV.
2001, 2012 (1998).
32 In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), a man “heard voices” that commanded him to do things. One of those things was to make a confession. Id. at 161.
Lower courts, based on testimony from psychologists, concluded that this was not voluntary and therefore was inadmissible. Id. at 161–62. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that before a confession could be deemed involuntary, there must be “coercive police
activity.” Since there was none here, it was not involuntary. Id. at 167.
33 See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341–42, 345 (1943); Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449, 453 (1957).
34 18 U.S.C. § 595 (1940) (“It shall be the duty of the marshal, his deputy, or other
officer, who may arrest a person charged with any crime or offense, to take the defendant
before the nearest United States commissioner or the nearest judicial officer having jurisdiction under existing laws for a hearing, commitment, or taking bail for trial . . . .”).
35 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
36 See McNabb, 318 U.S. at 341–42, 345; Mallory, 354 U.S. at 451, 453. See also
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 354 (1994) (“The so-called McNabbMallory rule . . . generally rendered inadmissible confessions made during periods of detention that violated the prompt presentment requirement of Rule 5(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 5(a) provides that a person arrested for a federal offense shall be taken ‘without unnecessary delay’ before the nearest federal magistrate, or
before a state or local judicial officer authorized to set bail for federal offenses under 18
U.S.C. § 3041, for a first appearance, or presentment.”) (internal citations omitted).
37 The Miranda opinion noted both the history of the “third degree” and the danger
of false confessions. It described the modern interrogation process as “psychologically
rather than physically oriented.” Miranda v. United States, 384 U.S. 436, 445–48 (1966).

663-692 RYCHLAK.DOC

670

9/18/2007 7:02:25 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 10:663

ment, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which did apply to the
states, gave criminal defendants only those fundamental rights
deemed “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”38 In the
1960s, the Supreme Court began to read the Fourteenth
Amendment in a new manner. Instead of looking for fundamental rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, it moved to
“selective incorporation” of provisions contained in the Bill of
Rights.39 By moving to this approach, the Supreme Court led a
revolution in American criminal procedure and provided all of
the following rights to state criminal defendants: the freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures and the exclusionary
rule;40 the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment;41
the right to assistance of counsel in felony cases;42 the privilege
against self-incrimination;43 the right to confront opposing witnesses;44 the right to a speedy trial;45 the right to compel defense
witnesses to appear at trial;46 the right to a jury trial;47 and protection against double jeopardy.48 In 1972, the death penalty was
declared unconstitutional as it was then applied,49 and in 1973,
states were prohibited from outlawing abortions in the early
stages of pregnancy.50
Regarding interrogations and confessions, the Supreme
Court first adopted a rule based upon the Sixth Amendment.51
Massiah v. United States prohibited the police from “deliberately
eliciting” statements from an individual after the initiation of judicial proceedings (indictment, information, arraignment, or preliminary hearing) without an attorney being present.52 The following month, in Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court created the
“focus” test, enforcing the right to counsel at the point when an
investigation focuses on the accused with the purpose of eliciting

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–28 (1937).
The selective incorporation doctrine was established by Justice Reed in Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 51–54 (1947).
40 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
41 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
42 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
43 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
44 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965).
45 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222–23 (1967).
46 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967).
47 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
48 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969).
49 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam).
50 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). See also Ronald J. Rychlak, Abortion,
Thinking Americans, and Judicial Politics, 14 LIFE AND LEARNING 77, 85–86 (2004).
51 Until 1964, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the states.
See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964).
52 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). This test remains valid even after Miranda. See, e.g.,
Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 523–24 (2004).
38
39
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a confession.53 The next year, the Court switched to a Fifth
Amendment analysis and set forth the now-familiar Miranda
rules.
II. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA
The Fifth Amendment protects an individual from being
“compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”54 In the 1966 case Miranda v. Arizona,55 the Court held
that certain procedural rights had to be afforded to suspects in a
custodial interrogation context in order to safeguard Fifth
Amendment rights.56 The Court examined the facts of four different cases collectively and developed not one holding but what
some call “a complex series of holdings.”57 A confession by a suspect in a custodial setting, even though voluntarily made, would
be inadmissible unless, preceding the confession, the suspect was
given four warnings: (1) that he had the right to remain silent,
(2) that any statement could be used against him, (3) that he had
the right to have an attorney present at any questioning, and (4)
that he had the right to have an attorney appointed if the suspect
was without funds. While the Court pointed out that these rights
could be waived, such a waiver would be examined to ensure it
was made both “knowingly and intelligently.”58 Confusion alone
does not make the decision to waive the right to remain silent invalid. In Connecticut v. Barrett, the defendant refused to make a
written statement, but agreed to “talk.”59 He later argued that
378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).
U.S. CONST. amend. V. Before Miranda, “compulsion” to testify meant legal compulsion so that the witness faced the potential of perjury or contempt. Reliance on Fifth
Amendment application to informal compulsion rejected much precedent but was not contrary to constitutional interpretation. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 437–38 (1987).
55 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
56 Id. at 467. The Court researched police manuals as a source of current police
practices and concluded that even without violence or police brutality, “custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals.” Id. at 455.
57 Schulhofer, supra note 54, at 436. Schulhofer divides the holding into three parts:
(1) that informal pressure to speak can equal compulsion under the Fifth Amendment, (2)
that compulsion exists in any custodial interrogation, and (3) that warnings are necessary
to “dispel the compelling pressure of custodial interrogation.” Id. He finds the most controversial part of the holding to be the third step, but he believes that the central part of
the decision lies within the other parts of the holding. Id.
58 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. The Court later weakened these rights by allowing prewarning statements to be used for impeachment purposes only, not as substantive evidence. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975). Some view Miranda as a compromise between the “totality of the circumstances” analysis and a complete annihilation of
confessions, as it combined the impact of both the custody and the interrogation on the
suspect to determine coercion. Yale Kamisar, Miranda: The Case, the Man, and the Players, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1074, 1077 (1984) (reviewing LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW
AND POLITICS (1983)).
59 479 U.S. 523, 525 (1987).
53
54
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this showed that he was confused about the consequences. The
Court, however, held that the oral statement was admissible.60
Likewise, in Colorado v. Spring, the defendant agreed to talk
about one crime.61 In the course of the interrogation, the questioning shifted to another crime and he made incriminating
statements. The defendant said that he did not know what he
was waiving, but the Court held that these statements were admissible.62
The Miranda Court did not claim to have discovered something new in the Constitution that had been overlooked for 180
years. Nor did the Miranda Court state that these warnings
were constitutionally required.63 Rather, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that the warnings were “safeguards” of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.64 To ensure
that an accused person is not coerced into incriminating himself,
he “must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and
the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.”65 The Court
immediately added that the suggested words were not intended
to be a “constitutional straitjacket,” and encouraged Congress
and states to be creative about other ways to protect the rights of
suspects.66 The Court did, however, demand that any other
methods be at least as effective as the Miranda warnings.67
The exact constitutional status of the Miranda warnings became a matter of dispute. In Michigan v. Tucker, Justice
Rehnquist wrote that the Miranda warnings “were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution . . . .”68 In Oregon v.
Elstad, Justice O’Connor explained that “errors . . . made by law
enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic Miranda
procedures . . . should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself.”69
Id. at 530.
479 U.S. 564, 566–68 (1987).
Id. at 577.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
Id. at 444.
Id. at 467.
Id. But see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443–44 (2000) (finding 18
U.S.C. § 3501 to be unconstitutional).
67 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. Of course, Miranda’s effectiveness is subject to serious
debate. See infra note 86 and accompanying text. For an interesting proposal to expand
the Miranda warnings to include, among other things, a reminder of the benefits of a
truthful statement, even if it is incriminating, see Milhizer, supra note 30, at 99–100.
“True and heartfelt confessions of guilt can likewise be greatly beneficial to the common
good.” Id. at 5.
68 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974). Rather, the Court noted that the
warnings were “measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination
was protected.” Id. at 444.
69 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985). The Court held that “fruit” of a non-coercive Miranda
violation, at least when the fruit is a subsequent confession, need not be suppressed. Id. at
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
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On the other hand, according to Miranda, both federal and state
law enforcement officials had to give the warnings.70 Since the
Supreme Court did not have the power to create rules of evidence
for the states unless that power came from constitutional interpretation, many argued that the Court must have found the
warnings to be required by the Constitution. This issue would
not be resolved until 2000.71
III. THE CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO MIRANDA
Within two years of the Miranda decision, Congress tried to
change things back. It seemed clear that Miranda was intended
to discourage suspects from confessing to the police,72 and it was
likely that this would have an adverse impact on criminal prosecutions and ultimately on the crime rate. So, taking heed of Justice John Harlan’s dissenting opinion that the “social costs of
crime are too great to call the new rules [enunciated in Miranda]
anything but a hazardous experimentation,”73 Congress enacted
18 U.S.C. § 3501, which stated, “In any criminal prosecution
brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a
confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible
in evidence if it is voluntarily given.”74 Section 3501 was passed
304.

See 384 U.S. at 498–99.
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442.
Milhizer, supra note 30, at 21 (“The only plausible explanation for the Court’s hyperbolic advice is that it wanted the Miranda warnings to discourage suspects from confessing to police.”).
73 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
74 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000).
§ 3501. Admissibility of confessions
70
71
72

(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District
of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in
evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any
issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was
voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall
permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and
shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it
deserves under all the circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into
consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession,
including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he
was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession,
(3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used
against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.
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as part of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 and required
only that a confession be offered voluntarily in order for it to be
used in court, thereby bypassing Miranda-related legal and evidentiary requirements.
Congress left no doubt that the purpose of § 3501 was to reverse Miranda. The statute provided that, while the trial court
is deciding whether a confession is voluntary, it should take into
account all circumstances surrounding the confession (including
whether Miranda-type warnings were given).75 The absence of
such warnings, however, would not preclude admissibility of an
otherwise voluntary confession.76
Even though the Supreme Court frequently noted that the
Miranda warnings were not required by the Constitution, that
they were merely “prophylactic” protections of the Fifth Amendment guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination,77 for
thirty years the Attorneys General refused to enforce § 3501, believing that it was unconstitutional.78 Then, in February of 1999,
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken
into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
(c) In any criminal prosecution by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession made or given by a person who is a defendant therein,
while such person was under arrest or other detention in the custody of any
law-enforcement officer or law-enforcement agency, shall not be inadmissible
solely because of delay in bringing such person before a magistrate judge or
other officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the
laws of the United States or of the District of Columbia if such confession is
found by the trial judge to have been made voluntarily and if the weight to be
given the confession is left to the jury and if such confession was made or given
by such person within six hours immediately following his arrest or other detention: Provided, That the time limitation contained in this subsection shall
not apply in any case in which the delay in bringing such person before such
magistrate judge or other officer beyond such six-hour period is found by the
trial judge to be reasonable considering the means of transportation and the
distance to be traveled to the nearest available such magistrate judge or other
officer.
(d) Nothing contained in this section shall bar the admission in evidence of
any confession made or given voluntarily by any person to any other person
without interrogation by anyone, or at any time at which the person who made
or gave such confession was not under arrest or other detention.
(e) As used in this section, the term “confession” means any confession of guilt
of any criminal offense or any self-incriminating statement made or given
orally or in writing.
Id.

Id. § 3501(b)(3).
Id. § 3501(b)(5).
See Darmer, supra note 4, at 344.
In a concurring opinion in Davis v. United States, Justice Scalia wondered why,
“with limited exceptions [§ 3501] has been studiously avoided by every Administration,
not only in this Court but in the lower courts, since its enactment more than 25 years
ago.” 512 U.S. 452, 463–64 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring). He indicated that while he reserved judgment, it “seems” that the act’s voluntariness consideration, not Miranda, is
75
76
77
78
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a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit ruled in United States v. Dickerson that the Miranda
warning no longer governed the admissibility of confessions in
federal court.79
Dickerson involved a bank robber from Maryland who confessed to his part in several heists.80 A lower court suppressed
the confession on the grounds that it had been given before he
was read his Miranda rights.81 The Fourth Circuit, however, reversed the decision and ruled that § 3501 was the governing authority, despite the fact that the government did not base its argument on this law.82 The case then went to the U.S. Supreme
Court.
In its 2000 decision in Dickerson v. United States, the Court
broke with the past and elevated Miranda to constitutional
status.83 Section 3501 was found to be insufficient to protect the
Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate oneself.84 Miranda
rights would now be considered part and parcel of the Fifth
Amendment. Thus, according to the Dickerson Court, the failure
to Mirandize a suspect was inherently coercive—no matter how
well the suspect may have been treated, no matter how much his
physical comfort had been respected, and no matter how well he
may already have known his rights.85
IV. THE IMPACT OF MIRANDA ON CRIME
Many scholars have attempted to obtain empirical evidence
regarding confessions and the impact of Miranda, but as pointed
out by other panelists at this Symposium, the difficulty of gathering and evaluating the evidence has led to inconclusive results.86
the legal standard for the admissibility of confessions. Id. at 464. The refusal of prosecutors to argue for the application of § 3501 means that courts might be wasting their time
looking at a “host of ‘Miranda’ issues that might be entirely irrelevant under federal
law.” Id. at 465. Further, Justice Scalia said that he would “no longer be open to the argument that [the Supreme Court] should continue to ignore the commands of § 3501 simply because the Executive declines to insist that we observe them.” Id. at 464. He said he
looked forward to a time “when a case that comes [under § 3501] is next presented to [the
Supreme Court].” Id. at 464.
79 United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 692 (4th Cir. 1999).
80 Id. at 671.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 695.
83 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000).
84 Id. at 442.
85 See id. at 444; McCarthy, supra note 8 (“Failing to provide Miranda rights is sure
to be found by many federal judges to be a form of lawless coercive interrogation that fits
within [the] . . . prohibition against cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment. This is especially so given that judges frequently resort to legislative history in construing vague,
confusing, inexact statutory terms. Anyone reading the Congressional Record here will
find that the whole purpose . . . was to make coercive interrogation illegal.”).
86 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 3, at 291. See also Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s “Neg-
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Some commentators argue that its costs, in terms of lost convictions, are too great to justify the limited benefits Miranda supplies.87 It has been suggested that thousands of violent criminals
escape justice each year as a direct result of Miranda.88 As one
noted critic of Miranda has argued:
Evidence of Miranda’s harmful effects is mounting. For example,
along with various co-authors, I have developed empirical evidence of
Miranda’s substantial harm to law enforcement. In my most recent
articles, I have analyzed the precipitous drop in crime clearance rates
that followed immediately on the heels of Miranda and concluded that
Miranda severely hampered police effectiveness.89

Other commentators argue that the cost of Miranda is
minimal and the significant benefits include protection of the innocent.90 Still others have even suggested that the warnings
themselves, used properly, are actually helpful in obtaining
statements from suspects.91
ligible” Effect on Law Enforcement: Some Skeptical Observations, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 327 (1997). As one British court noted, the right not to testify elicits “strong but
unfocused” feelings. Regina v. Director of Serious Fraud Office, Ex parte Smith, [1993]
A.C. 1, 30–34 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Q.B.) (U.K.) (discussing the right to silence and
different immunities encompassed by this term).
87 See Dennis, supra note 14, at 342–53 (concluding that the criminal justice system
should apply the privilege in limited contexts and not view it as a human right); David
Dolinko, Is there a Rationale for the Privilege against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 1063, 1064 (1986) (describing the privilege as a historical relic). Philosopher Jeremy
Bentham, one of the earliest critics of the privilege, thought that the innocent would want
to speak, and therefore the privilege would only protect the guilty. See BENTHAM, supra
note 14, at 238; see also Dennis, supra at 342 n.2 (citing Bentham’s views regarding the
privilege against self-incrimination); WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 48–54 (summarizing
Bentham’s treatise on privilege).
88 Cassell & Fowles, Handcuffing The Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s
Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1126 (1998). See also Milhizer, supra note 30, at 53 (noting that Miranda was based on the “Reid Model” of psychological interrogation, which has since become “widely disfavored within the psychological
community”).
89 Cassell, supra note 24, at 531 (citations omitted).
[T]he innocent are at risk not only from false confessions, but also from “lost”
confessions—that is, confessions that police fail to obtain from guilty criminals
that might help innocent persons who would otherwise come under suspicion
for committing a crime[ or become a victim of the criminals who did not confess].
....
. . . [T]here is good reason to believe that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Miranda has exacerbated the risks to the innocent. The Miranda decision has
reduced the number of truthful confessions, while at the same time doing nothing about, and probably even worsening, the false confession problem by diverting the focus of courts away from the substantive truth of confessions to procedural issues about how they were obtained.
Id. at 525–527 (citation omitted).
90 See SUSAN M. EASTON, THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 60–62 (1991) (arguing that the innocent are protected by the right to silence); Dennis, supra note 14, at 348 (describing
protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction as a justification for the privilege).
91 See SIMON, supra note 15, at 199.
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Even if Miranda can be used by interrogators to help obtain
statements from some suspects (and there is every reason to believe that the police try to exploit any remaining “loopholes”),92
the rules are certainly designed to dissuade suspects from making uninformed statements. If the rules are serving their intended purpose, they make life harder for interrogators and
prosecutors. Logically, then, they would have the same impact
on those trying to gain information to assist with the War on Terror.
Miranda is essentially an exclusionary rule.93 Statements
taken in violation of it cannot be used against the defendant in a
subsequent prosecution, but if the suspect who was interrogated
is not prosecuted, the exclusionary aspect of Miranda has no application. Moreover, there are many exceptions that negate
Miranda’s effect in specific cases.94 There is also a certain lack of
logic in a rule that assumes that any statement taken without
warnings must have been coerced, but does not presume that
waivers of the right to remain silent or to have an attorney have
been coerced.95 As Justice Douglas stated in a pre-Miranda case,
the “trial of the issue of coercion is seldom helpful,” with police
officers “usually testify[ing] one way, the accused another.”96
Miranda does little to change this problem. It just creates a fact
question, and the prosecution has the burden of proof to show
that the suspect understood his or her rights before waiving
See Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004) (plurality opinion).
Traditionally, it has been said that there is no violation until the statement is
used at trial. See Darmer, supra note 4, at 345–46 (quoting United States v. Bin Laden,
132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 181–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)). In Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760
(2003), however, the Court ruled that whether the suspect’s substantive due process
rights had been violated and an action could proceed against the interrogator had to be
addressed on remand, even though the statement was not used at trial. Id. at 772 (“Our
views on the proper scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause do not
mean that police torture or other abuse that results in a confession is constitutionally
permissible so long as the statements are not used at trial; it simply means that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than the Fifth Amendment’s SelfIncrimination Clause, would govern the inquiry in those cases and provide relief in appropriate circumstances.”).
94 See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (holding that un-Mirandized
confessions may still be used for impeachment purposes); Bowen v. State, 607 So. 2d 1159
(Miss. 1992) (noting that when a defendant is entitled to Miranda warnings and does not
receive them, any voluntary statement made by him may be used for impeachment purposes); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (establishing an exception to Miranda
for questioning prompted by concern for public safety).
95 As pointed out by Justice White, “if the defendant may not answer without a
warning a question such as ‘Where were you last night?’ without having his answer be a
compelled one, how can the Court ever accept his negative answer to the question of
whether he wants to consult his retained counsel or counsel whom the court will appoint?”
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 536 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
96 Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 443–44 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting). He
went on to note that the nature of the process gives defendants “little chance to prove coercion” at trial.
92
93
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them.
Some commentators even believe that the police have
learned to work with (or around) the Miranda rules so well that
they have become nothing more than minor inconveniences or
perhaps even tools that the authorities can exploit in an interrogation.97 Certainly there are some officers who would lie, denyConsider the following passage:
The detective offers a cigarette, not your brand, and begins an uninterrupted monologue that wanders back and forth for a half hour more, eventually
coming to rest in a familiar place: “You have the absolute right to remain silent.”

97

Of course you do. You’re a criminal. Criminals always have the right to
remain silent. At least once in your miserable life, you spent an hour in front
of a television set, listening to this book-’em-Danno routine. You think Joe Friday was lying to you? . . . Get it straight: A police detective, a man who gets
paid government money to put you in prison, is explaining your absolute right
to shut up before you say something stupid.
“Anything you say or write may be used against you in a court of law.”
. . . . You’re now being told that talking to a police detective in an interrogation room can only hurt you. If it could help you, they would probably be
pretty quick to say that, wouldn’t they? They’d stand up and say you have the
right not to worry because what you say or write in this godforsaken cubicle is
gonna be used to your benefit in a court of law. No, your best bet is to shut up.
Shut up now.
“You have the right to talk with a lawyer at any time—before any questioning, before answering any questions, or during any questions.”
Talk about helpful. Now the man who wants to arrest you for violating the
peace and dignity of the state is saying you can talk to a trained professional,
an attorney who has read the relevant portions of the Maryland Annotated
Code or can at least get his hands on some Cliffs Notes. And let’s face it, pal,
you just carved up a drunk in a Dundalk Avenue bar, but that don’t make you
a neurosurgeon. Take whatever help you can get.
“If you want a lawyer and cannot afford to hire one, you will not be asked
any questions, and the court will be requested to appoint a lawyer for you.”
Translation: You’re a derelict. No charge for derelicts.
At this point, if all lobes are working, you ought to have seen enough of
this Double Jeopardy category to know that it ain’t where you want to be. How
about a little something from Criminal Lawyers and Their Clients for $50,
Alex?
Whoa, punk, not so fast.
“Before we get started, lemme just get through the paperwork,” says the
detective, who now produces an Explanation of Rights sheet, BPD Form 69,
and passes it across the table.
“EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS,” declares the top line in bold block letters.
The detective asks you to fill in your name, address, age, and education, then
the date and time. That much accomplished, he asks you to read the next section. It begins, “YOU ARE HEREBY ADVISED THAT:”
Read number one, the detective says. Do you understand number one?
“You have the absolute right to remain silent.”
Yeah, you understand. We did this already.
“Then write your initials next to number one. Now read number two.”
And so forth, until you have initialed each component of the Miranda
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ing any brutal or coercive conduct that resulted in a statement
from the suspect.98 Those same officers, however, are likely to
testify falsely that they gave appropriate Miranda warnings.
They may also technically comply with Miranda while still putting the suspect through a very traumatic experience.99
Whatever the effectiveness of Miranda, the release of a
common criminal may deny justice, but it usually poses a minimal threat to society. Terrorism changes that equation. For that
reason, one must ask whether a criminal procedure rule such as
Miranda, or—more broadly—the right not to be coerced into selfincrimination, should even apply in terrorism cases.
V. IS PROTECTION FROM SELF-INCRIMINATION PROPER IN THE
TERRORISM CONTEXT?
In the context of domestic criminal cases, the Miranda warnings operate to protect suspects’ rights and to make interrogators’
and prosecutors’ jobs more difficult. The question is whether the
same concerns that justify the right not to incriminate oneself in
domestic criminal cases are applicable when it comes to the investigation of international terrorism. The two primary concerns
are: false testimony brought during interrogation (reliability) and
the related issue of brutal tactics being used by police authorities
in order to elicit incriminating statements (torture).
A. Reliability
If suspects are forced to speak, investigators might get bad
information.100 Consider the case of Brown v. Mississippi, in
warning. That done, the detective tells you to write your signature on the next
line, the one just below the sentence that says, “I HAVE READ THE ABOVE
EXPLANATION OF MY RIGHTS AND FULLY UNDERSTAND IT.”
You sign your name and the monologue resumes.
SIMON, supra note 15, at 193–94. “As a result, the same law enforcement community that
once regarded the 1966 Miranda decision as a death blow to criminal investigation has
now come to see the explanation of rights as a routine part of the process—simply a piece
of station house furniture, if not a civilizing influence on police work itself.” Id. at 199.
98 “Put bluntly, an officer inclined to take a swing at a suspect surely would not hesitate to ignore the Miranda protections yet then insist on the witness stand that he had
given the prescribed warnings.” Darmer, supra note 4, at 341.
99 For example, in Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 600 (3d Cir. 1986), a very skillful
interrogator, fully compliant with Miranda, verbally dominated a suspect to the point
that, after confessing, he collapsed in a catatonic state. The court included the transcript
of the interrogation in an appendix. See id. at app.
100 See, e.g., PHILLIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING
WITHOUT WAR 109–11 (2003); Sanford Levinson, “Precommitment” and “Postcommitment”:
The Ban on Torture in the Wake of September 11, 81 TEX. L. REV. 2013, 2028–29 (2003);
Leo & Ofshe, supra note 24; Jan Hoffman, Police Refine Methods So Potent, Even the Innocent Have Confessed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1998, at Al; Thomas H. Maugh II, Glendale
Case Raises Issue of Reliability of Confessions, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1998, at Al.
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which the defendant’s conviction was based solely on a confession
induced by beatings.101 He had been hanged twice by the local
deputy and other men—the marks on his neck were still visible
at trial—then whipped. When he would not confess, he was released only to be picked up two days later, whipped again, and
told that the whippings would continue until he confessed and
agreed to every detail that the deputy suggested. The defendant’s story, in fact, changed several times to fit the facts as they
were explained to him. The confession was admitted at trial, and
the jury convicted and sentenced him to death.102 The U.S. Supreme Court held that this violated the Fourteenth Amendment.103 In fact, it called the Mississippi Supreme Court decision
upholding the conviction a denial of due process in and of itself.
As illustrated in the Brown case, and totally aside from the
related concern for the just treatment of citizens, unrestrained
interrogation may lead to bad information. That would serve
neither the purpose of justice in a criminal context, nor would it
serve governmental forces fighting terror. Moreover, false confessions and bad information are not elicited only when physical
abuse is involved. Mental duress can also lead to false confessions.104 The right not to incriminate oneself helps protect
against this concern.
False confessions that have been obtained in criminal cases
often have been driven by animus based on factors such as race,
politics, the desire of police authorities to “close” a case, or other
personal interests. Such factors could impact a terror-related interrogation, but the risk is significantly lower, due in part to the
different goal. In regular criminal investigations, the goal for the
officer is to make an arrest and get the suspect off the street.
The evidence will be tested, if ever, at some uncertain date in the
future, when someone else (the prosecutor) will try to obtain a
conviction and close the case. In that circumstance, the statement is valuable to the arresting officer regardless of whether it
is accurate.
Interrogators in the terrorism context are seeking information, not trying to get a conviction, and time is far more likely to
be of the essence. They know that a statement, much less a false
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
Id. at 279.
Id. at 287.
See Human Rights Watch, U.S.: CIA Whitewashing Torture: Statements by Goss
Contradict
U.S.
Law
and
Practice,
PEACE
JOURNALISM,
Nov.
2005,
http://peacejournalism.com/ReadArticle.asp?ArticleID=6948. An American citizen taken
into Czech custody on charges of espionage while working as bureau chief for the Associated Press in Prague signed a false confession after being interrogated for six days. He
had been kept awake for over forty-two straight hours.
101
102
103
104
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statement, will not close their case. Interrogation may, however,
help them thwart a serious threat to peace. Importantly, interrogators seem to think that pressure—physical or non-physical—
is more beneficial than not.105 They are in the best position to
evaluate the risk of bad information from aggressive interrogation. They know the risks of false statements, and yet—in every
society—they continually return to forceful methods of interrogation.106 Those who are outside of that community are not close
enough to the matter to successfully prove that the risk of false
statements is sufficiently serious so as to justify providing terrorist suspects with the right not to incriminate themselves.107 Accordingly, and without intending in any way to condone overlyaggressive interrogation, much less torture, this “potentially bad
information” argument is an insufficient justification for the
right not to incriminate oneself, at least in a terrorist-related
situation. It certainly does not justify applying the Miranda rule
in this context.

Levinson, supra note 100, at 2029–31.
Id. See also infra notes 112–126 and accompanying text.
In fact, scholars have been debating the empirical evidence ever since Miranda
was announced. See, e.g., Cassell, supra note 24, at 527–29.
105
106
107
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B. Morality and Torture
A related argument in support of the privilege against selfincrimination is that without it, interrogators might be tempted
to coerce suspects into making statements, and they could slide
into overly-aggressive interrogation or even torture.108 At times,
of course, they would have an innocent person in custody. This is
an ancient concern. St. Augustine wrote of it in the fifth century:
[The accused] is tortured to discover whether he is guilty, so that,
though innocent, he suffers most undoubted punishment for crime
that is still doubtful; not because it is proved that he committed it, but
because it is not ascertained that he did not commit it. Thus the ignorance of the judge frequently involves an innocent person in suffering . . . [T]he result of this lamentable ignorance is that this very person, whom he tortured that he might not condemn him if innocent, is
condemned to death both tortured and innocent. For if he has chosen . . . to quit this life rather than endure any longer such tortures,
he declares that he has committed the crime which in fact he has not

108 For an analysis of slippery slope arguments and how they function, see Frederick
Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985); Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms
of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026 (2003).
In the Eighteenth Century, Saint Alphonsus Liguori in his Theologia Moralis, considered
three questions:
(a) Under what conditions can a judge proceed to have an accused person tortured . . . ? Answer: the judge may only “descend to torture” as a last resort,
i.e., when full proof cannot be obtained by non-violent means; next, there must
already be “semi-complete proof” (semiplenam probationem) of the accused’s
guilt arising from other evidence; and finally, certain classes of persons are to
be exempt from torture, either because of their frailty or their great value to
society: “men of great dignity[,”] knights of equestrian orders, royal officials,
soldiers, doctors [probably in the general sense of learned men] and their children, pre-pubescent children, senile old folks, pregnant women, and those who
are still weak after childbirth.

(b) To what extent may the accused be tortured . . . ? Answer: the more convincing the already-existing evidence for his guilt, the more severely he may be
tortured, but—taking into account the varying estimated endurance-levels [sic]
of different individuals—never so severely that “it is morally impossible for
him to endure” the pain. If that level of cruelty is in fact reached, “the confession thus extorted will be involuntary and so must be considered legally null
and void[,”] even if the accused, for fear of further torment, subsequently ratifies his confession outside the torture chamber in the presence of the judge.
(c) Whether one who has already been tortured may be tortured again . . . ?
Answer: not if he refuses to confess during the first torture session (unless new
independent evidence against him subsequently comes to light). In that case
he must be set free. But if he confesses under torture, and then retracts that
confession before the judge, he may be tortured again—and even a third time if
the same thing happens after the second torture session. But if he confesses
under torture a third time, and yet again subsequently retracts in the presence
of the judge, he must be released. For the judge then must presume that his
three confessions were all forced and involuntary—and therefore invalid.
Brian W. Harrison, Torture and Corporal Punishment as a Problem in Catholic Theology,
LIVING TRADITION, Sept. 2005, at pt. II A11, http://www.rtforum.org/lt/lt119.html (citing
Theologia Moralis 4:3:3 nos. 202–04) (third alteration in original) (formatting altered).
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committed [and] has been condemned and put to death . . . .109

Overly-aggressive interrogation may be a particularly serious
threat in the terrorism context.110
When it comes to criminal investigations, many authorities
have concluded that the harsh practices associated with “the
third degree” are less effective in obtaining truthful statements
than psychologically-oriented techniques designed to reduce the
suspect’s resistance in the typical criminal investigation.111 In
terror-related situations, however, the evidence suggests that the
less aggressive interrogation tactics tend not to be as successful.112 Military interrogators are certainly using tactics that are
far more aggressive than would be acceptable in common criminal cases. Indeed, the events of September 11 have caused serious scholars to debate the previously unthinkable prospect of legalized torture.113

109 ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 19:6 (Marcus Dods trans., Random House, Inc.
1950) (426).
110 Of course, the first issue is to reach a consensus on the meaning of “torture.” The
practice lacks a clear definition in international agreements and in American law. As
Richard Posner, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit and Senior Lecturer at the
University of Chicago Law School, has noted, “Almost all official interrogation is coercive,
yet not all coercive interrogation would be called ‘torture’ by any competent user of the
English language, so that what is involved in using the word is picking out the point
along a continuum at which the observer’s queasiness turns to revulsion.” Richard A.
Posner, Torture, Terrorism, and Interrogation, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 291, 291 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004). In other words, there is a continuum of pressure that can be
used during interrogation ranging from an uncomfortable chair and warm lights to extreme physical abuse (and perhaps even worse). Posner has written, “only the most doctrinaire civil libertarians (not that there aren’t plenty of them) deny [that] if the stakes
are high enough, torture is permissible.” Richard A. Posner, The Best Offense, NEW
REPUBLIC, Sept. 2, 2002, at 28, 30 (reviewing ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM
WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE (2002)). Moreover, Posner has written that “[n]o one who doubts that this is the case should be in a position of responsibility.” Id.
111 See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 24, at 434 n.10 (“Interrogators may have become
more effective at obtaining confession statements than they were in the prior era of third
degree interrogation.”).
112 YOO, supra note 6, at 189.
113 See, e.g., TORTURE: A COLLECTION, supra note 110; Jeremy Waldron, Torture and
Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005); Anthony Lewis, Making Torture Legal, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 15, 2004, at 4; Dershowitz:
Torture
Could
Be
Justified,
CNN.COM/LAW
CENTER,
Mar.
4,
2003,
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/LAW/03/03/cnna.Dershowitz/ (discussing the possibility with
Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz). Dershowitz has proposed “torture warrants” in
cases of “ticking time bomb terrorists.” ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS:
UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 141 (2002). See also Alan
M. Dershowitz, Is There a Torturous Road to Justice?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, at B19;
Alan M. Dershowitz, Want to Torture? Get a Warrant, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 22, 2002, at A19.
Dershowitz would restrict warrants to only the most egregious cases. See, e.g., Alan M.
Dershowitz, Letter to the Editor, ‘Torture Warrants,’ S.F. CHRON., Jan. 28, 2002, at B4
(“My personal hope is that no torture warrant would ever be issued, because the criteria
for obtaining one would be so limited and rigorous.”).
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It is worth noting that the United States is not the only nation to reconsider its interrogation regulations in light of modern
terrorism. In Israel, for instance, “interrogators used thirddegree practices on alleged Palestinian terrorists, some of whom
died in custody. The Supreme Court of Israel recently outlawed
these practices, but left open the possibility that torture could be
justified in ‘ticking bomb’ situations.”114
Similarly, in the early 1970s, “the British and Irish governments . . . found it necessary to reduce the strength of the privilege against self-incrimination in the name of fighting terrorism.”115 They “introduced security measures that . . . , inter alia,
allow[ed] courts to draw inferences from a defendant’s refusal to
answer questions regarding his membership in a terrorist
group.”116 They “justified laws allowing courts to draw adverse
inferences from an accused’s silence and other derogations of the
right to silence by pointing out the sophistication of the IRA and
other para-military groups in their ability to resist questioning . . . .”117
One reason why the right to refuse to testify is so important
is because if defendants can be forced to testify, they will—at
least sometimes—be intimidated into making false confessions.
The concern over the use of torture to obtain confessions is wellembedded in American history. The 1788 debate in the Virginia
Convention on the ratification of the Constitution contains this
interesting discussion on the topic:
Patrick Henry: . . . .
....
But Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that of the common law. They may introduce the practice of
France, Spain, and Germany—of torturing, to extort a confession of
the crime. They will say that they might as well draw examples from
those countries as from Great Britain, and they will tell you that there
is such a necessity of strengthening the arm of government, that they
must have a criminal equity, and extort confession by torture, in order
to punish with still more relentless severity. We are then lost and undone.
114 John Parry & Welsh White, Interrogating a Suspected Terrorist, JURIST LEGAL
INTELLIGENCE (2001), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/terrorism/terrorismparry.htm.
115 Stacey Carrara Friends, Note, An Effective Way to Deal with Terrorism? Britain
and Ireland Restrict the Right to Silence, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 227, 249 (1999).
116 Id. at 227 (citing Home News: Commons Special Debate, IRISH TIMES, Sept. 3,
1998). “In December 1998, however, Parliament changed the law slightly in light of the
European Court of Human Rights ruling . . . .” Id. at 227 n.2 (citing Steve Doughty,
Judges Force Retreat over Right to Silence, THE DAILY MAIL, Dec. 2, 1998, at 2). “Courts
may now only draw inferences from the silence of an accused person that occurs in the
presence of the accused’s lawyer.” Id.
117 Id. at 250.
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Mr. NICHOLAS: . . . But the gentleman says that, by this Constitution, they have power to make laws to define crimes and prescribe
punishments; and that, consequently, we are not free from torture. . . . If we had no security against torture but our declaration of
rights, we might be tortured to-morrow; for it has been repeatedly infringed and disregarded.
Mr. GEORGE MASON replied that the worthy gentleman was mistaken in his assertion that the bill of rights did not prohibit torture;
for that one clause expressly provided that no man can give evidence
against himself; and that the worthy gentleman must know that, in
those countries where torture is used, evidence was extorted from the
criminal himself. Another clause of the bill of rights provided that no
cruel and unusual punishments shall be inflicted; therefore, torture
was included in the prohibition.
Mr. NICHOLAS acknowledged the bill of rights to contain that prohibition, and that the gentleman was right with respect to the practice
of extorting confession from the criminal in those countries where torture is used; but still he saw no security arising from the bill of rights
as separate from the Constitution, for that it had been frequently violated with impunity.118

This concern about torture applied to both criminal activity
and warfare. During the Revolutionary War, General George
Washington and leaders of the Continental Congress considered
the just treatment of enemy combatants to be an important strategic concern.119 As Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. has noted, the American concern for just treatment of prisoners “was all the more extraordinary because these courtesies were not reciprocated by
King George’s armies. Indeed, the British conducted a deliberate
campaign of atrocities against American soldiers and civilians. . . . Captured Americans were tortured, starved and cruelly
maltreated aboard prison ships.”120 Kennedy went on to note:
President Lincoln instituted the first formal code of conduct for the
humane treatment of prisoners of war in 1863. Lincoln’s order forbade any form of torture or cruelty, and it became the model for the
1929 Geneva Convention. Dwight Eisenhower made a point to guarantee exemplary treatment to German POWs in World War II, and
Gen. Douglas McArthur ordered application of the Geneva Convention
during the Korean War, even though the U.S. was not yet a signatory.
In the Vietnam War, the United States extended the convention’s protection to Viet Cong prisoners even though the law did not technically
require it.121

118

1987).

5 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 377 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,

119 Robert F. Kennedy Jr., America’s Anti-Torture Tradition, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2005, at B21.
120 Id.
121 Id.
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Despite the concern about extorting confessions, governmental authorities used some very aggressive tactics in trying to obtain confessions well into the twentieth century.
In 1929, for instance, the Correctional Association of New
York
researched the court records and found “strong grounds for suspecting
that severe practices are employed to obtain information from those
who come into the hands of the police.” Among the abusive methods
in use throughout the United States at that time were solitary confinement, whipping by rubber hose, forcing a suspect to look at a deceased victim in the morgue, placing a skeleton in a suspect’s cell, and
handcuffing the suspect to a chair for thirty-seven hours.122
The Association lamented the fact that while “some States have
passed statutes against [the third degree] there seem to have been
practically no convictions under them.” The Association also observed
that “there is no practical redress for the individual . . . though the officers are civilly liable to the injured party for mistreating him, this
remedy is in practice of no avail.”123

At a very fundamental level, the concern over interrogation
slipping into torture is a moral decision, not a pragmatic one.124
American history and American values condemn torture of prisoners. It does not follow, however, that moral concerns would
justify the same rules in a terror-related scenario that apply in
common criminal law cases. In the terror context, when time is
likely to be of the essence and many lives may hang in the balance, some form of aggressive interrogation, beyond what is acceptable when considering common criminals, may be justifiable,
if not necessary. The threat is greater, the risk is higher, and the
time element may be significantly different.125

122 Ilan K. Reich, A CITIZEN CRUSADE FOR PRISON REFORM: THE HISTORY OF THE
CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK 45 (1994) (quoting PRISON ASS’N OF N.Y.,
NINETY-NINTH ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1943)).
123 Id. at 46 (quoting PRISON ASS’N OF N.Y., ONE HUNDRED THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 40
(1947)) (alterations in original).
124 There are those who argue that the law should not impose moral values. Without
delving into that argument in other contexts, it is certainly legitimate for a society to decide that authorities who are acting on behalf of the public should behave in a moral
manner. Cf. Carlos A. Ball, Autonomy, Justice, and Disability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 599,
609–10 (2000) (discussing whether there should be a moral obligation placed on the civil
government to help the disabled); Rychlak, supra note 50, at 94–97 (advocating for the
pro-life community to vote into the Senate those with similar moral stances on abortion in
order to change current abortion law and ultimately change the composition of the Supreme Court).
125 See generally David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L.
REV. 1425 (2005); Adam Raviv, Torture and Justification: Defending the Indefensible, 13
GEO. MASON L. REV. 135 (2004).
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At the same time, few, if any, citizens want to give interrogators full discretion to do whatever they wish.126 Elimination of all
rules and the threat of sanctions for the interrogators would open
the possibility of widespread abuse. Waterboarding has already
been publicly defended.127 What about beatings, amputations, or
inflicting pain on members of the suspect’s family? As Richard
John Neuhaus has stated:
How do we address these questions of what in fact is happening in circumstances in which conscientious Christians seek moral guidance,
and how can we do this without falling into the pits of relativism, proportionalism, consequentialism, and related errors? In the ticking
bomb instance, does the duty to protect thousands of innocents override the duty not to torture?128

Therefore, it is incumbent on modern lawmakers to find a way to
control interrogations and see that they do not turn into torture
sessions while permitting interrogators to extract critical information.129

126 Amnesty International’s webpage states: “The America We Believe In Does Not
Torture People.” Amnesty International USA, The America We Believe In Leads the
World on Human Rights, http://believe.amnestyusa.org/site/c.igLQIUOCKtF/b.2070843/
k.BDE5/Home.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2007). That view is certainly shared by many
Americans who do not agree with other aspects of the Amnesty International agenda.
Most religious groups also condemn torture. See, e.g., Adelle M. Banks, Religious and
Civil-Rights Coalition Asks Bush to Condemn Use of Torture, PRESBYTERIAN NEWS
SERVICE, Nov. 10, 2005, http://www.pcusa.org/pcnews/2005/05609.htm.
127 See Demetri Sevastopulo, Cheney Endorses Simulating Drowning, MSNBC, Oct.
26, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15433467/. See also Harrison, supra note 12, at
24 (stating that waterboarding “causes a brief, panic-inducing sensation of being about to
drown but no pain or injury”). On September 20, 2006, television host Bill O’Reilly had
Brian Ross of ABC News on his show. Deborah, Bill O’Reilly Endorses Waterboarding As
Safe and Reliable, NEWS HOUNDS, Sept. 20, 2006, http://www.newshounds.us/2006/09/20/
bill_oreilly_endorses_waterboarding_as_safe_and_reliable.php. Ross stated that “14 detainees with very important information about future terror plots broke down and talked
after [being subject to] waterboarding.” Id. He reported that “the toughest suspect broke
down in [two and a half] minutes,” but most detainees “only lasted for 30 seconds.” Id.
Ross “admitted that it probably could kill someone,” but the main thing about waterboarding is that it makes the subject feel like he is drowning because it triggers “an uncontrollable gag reflex.” Id.
128 Richard John Neuhaus, The Public Square: Secularization Doesn’t Just Happen,
FIRST THINGS, Mar. 2005, at 58, 62, available at http://www.firstthings.com/
article.php3?id_article=164.
129 There are at least four different reasons why an interrogator might resort to torture: (1) for the illegal enjoyment of the person inflicting the torture; (2) to extract a confession of criminal activity; (3) to punish an enemy or wrongdoer; or (4) to obtain information so as to prevent greater harm (the “ticking bomb” scenario). See Harrison, supra note
12, at 26. The concerns that relate to criminal law rules primarily address the first three
reasons. The torture scenario most often invoked when discussing terrorism, however, is
the fourth reason. See id. at 26–27. That is why the typical criminal law analysis does
not perfectly fit in the ticking bomb scenario. The moral equation is different. According
to Father Brian Harrison, a professor at the Pontifical University of Puerto Rico, the
Catholic Church has condemned the first three reasons for inflicting torture, but—
perhaps tellingly—has not expressly condemned torture in the fourth situation. Id.
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In light of these moral concerns, not to mention the international conventions, stripping all regulation from interrogation is
simply not a viable alternative. If the controls were completely
lifted, it is easy to imagine interrogators going too far. Therefore,
some controls must apply in these situations.130
VI. APPROPRIATE CONTROLS ON TERROR-RELATED
INTERROGATIONS
Recognizing that there is reason to place restrictions on interrogation, even in the terrorism scenario, the next question becomes whether Miranda-style protections should be given to the
suspects. The answer here must be “no.” Miranda is not a good
way to regulate terror interrogations. As Justice O’Connor explained in a 1993 case, “Because Miranda ‘sweeps more broadly
than the Fifth Amendment itself,’ it excludes some confessions
even though the Constitution would not.”131 Perhaps that is why
one Congressman said: “There’s not a single member of this Congress that believes that Miranda warnings should be given to
terrorists . . . .”132
Whatever the cost may be in the criminal context, terrorism
shifts the balance of this equation. The risk of a single criminal
going free is relatively small. Large terror-related organizations
are a different matter. “[T]he harm any individual ordinary
criminal can inflict, if wrongly freed, is limited. The potential
harm an al Qaeda operative can inflict is potentially enormous.”133 Criminal laws have long been written so as to recognize the additional danger associated with joint or group activity,

The Catechism of the Catholic Church provides:
Torture which uses physical or moral violence to extract confessions, punish
the guilty, frighten opponents, or satisfy hatred is contrary to respect for the
person and for human dignity. Except when performed for strictly therapeutic
medical reasons, directly intended amputations, mutilations, and sterilizations
performed on innocent persons are against the moral law.
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 2297 (1994). The Catechism goes on to state:
In times past, cruel practices were commonly used by legitimate governments
to maintain law and order . . . . In recent times it has become evident that
these cruel practices were neither necessary for public order, nor in conformity
with the legitimate rights of the human person. On the contrary, these practices led to ones even more degrading. It is necessary to work for their abolition. We must pray for the victims and their tormentors.
Id. at ¶ 2298.
131 Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 702 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985)).
132 Rep.
Hunter Sides with Bush Administration on Military Tribunals,
FOXNEWS.COM, July 12, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,203126,00.html
(quoting Rep. G.K. Butterfield).
133 YOO, supra note 6, at 201.
130
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and the danger presented by international terror organizations
must similarly be recognized by the law.
In a criminal investigation, if police questioning is prompted
by an immediate concern for public safety, the Supreme Court
has held that the officers may question the suspect without first
providing Miranda warnings.134 Moreover, the suspect’s answers
to these questions may be used not only to avert the immediate
threat but also as evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecution
against the suspect.135 This does not mean, of course, that any
and all tactics are legitimate when an officer is motivated by public safety concerns.136 Limits still have to be set to protect suspects from overly aggressive interrogation. For today’s purposes,
however, the key is that Miranda is not the way to protect those
suspects.
In the terrorist situation, it would seem that every interrogation—at least every one that is hypothesized when discussing the
ticking bomb scenario—can be said to be prompted by a concern
for the public safety. This does not mean that every tactic can be
justified in the terror-related scenario. If aggressive interrogations take place, there will be mistakes in determining who is a
legitimate suspect, and there will be times when techniques used
to obtain information will not be justified. In those cases, governmental officials should face an inquiry and be able to defend
their actions. Should they be unable to justify their actions, they
would be subject to possible punishment.137 If police are allowed
to use otherwise impermissible interrogation tactics when lives
are at stake, how far should they be permitted to go?138
43.

134

New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); see also Darmer, supra note 4, at 342–

Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659–60.
Id. at 656, 658 (stating that when officers ask questions, they need to be “reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety”) (emphasis added). A coerced, involuntary statement, for instance, would not be admissible under this Miranda exception. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317 (1985).
137 Two issues that require further development include: (1) where responsibility
should be attached, and (2) whether low-ranking officials who are ordered to carry out aggressive interrogations should be able to invoke the “Nuremberg defense” of superior orders. Henry T. King, Jr., The Legacy of Nuremberg, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 335, 340
(2002); Frank Lawrence, Note, The Nuremberg Principles: A Defense for Political Protesters, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 397, 413 (1989) (“[I was only] following superior orders . . . .”).
138 The answer to this question could have the long-term consequence of adversely
impacting the treatment of U.S. citizens who are held in other nations. As such, this is a
problem that calls for resolution. The rules of procedure and evidence for the International Criminal Court (ICC) provide for the protection of certain self-incriminating testimony. See Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory
Commission for the International Criminal Court add. 1, pt. I, ch. 4 R. 74(3), U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (Nov. 2, 2000). Perhaps more importantly, the ICC may have jurisdiction over those who commit torture in certain circumstances. See Neil A. Lewis,
Military’s Opposition to Harsh Interrogation is Outlined, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2005, at
A21; John M. Czarnetzky & Ronald J. Rychlak, An Empire of Law?: Legalism and the In135
136
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After-the-fact judicial or quasi-judicial investigations give
governmental authorities flexibility to deal with interrogation
problems that are impossible to foresee but likely to develop.
This approach strikes a balance between the two competing
needs (information to combat terrorism and just treatment of all
detainees) and succeeds where Miranda fails because it holds interrogators responsible if they “cross the line” but does not stop
the flow of information. This approach is not perfect; it will not
stop all overly-abusive tactics. The same, of course, can be said
of Miranda and almost every other device ever used to protect
against abusive interrogation.
Unlike Miranda, this approach requires that the analysis
and evaluation of the interrogation occur after the interrogation
has taken place.139 In the terrorism/ticking bomb scenario, this
approach is reasonable due to the immediate nature of the threat
because the issues are complex, and various factors are likely to
shift from one case to the next. It is not possible to develop in
advance a one-size-fits-all template to determine what level of
pressure can or should be applied to a given suspect and a particular threat.140 With after-the-fact hearings, however, various
principles and limitations designed to protect detainees from
overly-abusive tactics (and to let government authorities know
what is permissible) can and should be established. It can be assumed that they will evolve over the years.
CONCLUSION
Protection from forced self-incrimination is an important
value in our criminal law system, and Miranda is one way to enforce that right. Due to the increased threat and time pressures,
the analysis shifts in the terrorism/ticking bomb scenario. There
are still reasons to provide some level of protection against forced
self-incrimination to terrorist suspects, primarily to prevent interrogators from becoming overly abusive. The justifiable level of
pressure to be applied in any given terror-related case, however,
cannot be decided with certainty in advance. Too many factors
have to be taken into consideration.141 While there must be limiternational Criminal Court, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 55 (2003).
139 “Judges are good at focusing on what has happened in the past. Whether an attack might occur in the future, its magnitude, and how to stop it is beyond their usual expertise.” YOO, supra note 6, at 201. When it comes to terrorism, the same might be said of
legislators and regulators.
140 See Darmer, supra note 4, at 371 (“Beyond limiting the use of physical force to extract confessions, it is difficult to establish rules, in advance, on the permissible range of
tactics when seeking confessions.”).
141 The most extreme forms of torture (e.g. life-threatening, permanent injury, harm
to third parties) might well be prohibited in advance. In other cases, numerous factors
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tations, Miranda is not the appropriate way to enforce those limitations in the terrorism scenario. Rather, there must be afterthe-fact judicial or quasi-judicial investigations that can look at
all the facts and evaluate the actions of the interrogating authorities.
In the War on Terror, part of the battle is to thwart the enemy, part of it is to protect innocent citizens, and part of it is to
maintain moral standards. The United States will have to make
many decisions in future years, and those goals will sometimes
compete with each other. We should remember that military and
quasi-military actions are fundamentally different from criminal
investigation. Accordingly, we cannot simply take criminal law
doctrines and expect them to work in these new situations. At
the same time, we have to maintain a basic level of morality in
how we carry out governmental activities, and that may require
the development of new standards and procedures. It may be difficult to do this, but it is necessary if we are to defeat terrorism
without compromising our integrity.

must be considered, and that probably forecloses a hard-and-fast rule with broad application.
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